Judgment of Landgericht Berlin I (Berlin Regional Court I) of 22.07.2024

Certified copy

Landgericht Berlin I (Berlin Regional Court I)

In the name of the people

Case number: (522 Ks) 176 Js 4/22 (5/23)

In the criminal proceedings

a g a i n s t

Dmitry B a g r a s h,
born on 9 May 1968 in Moscow,
last resident at Leibnizstr. 40, 10629 Berlin,
currently at Justizvollzugsanstalt Moabit (Moabit Prison), prisoner register no.: 2796/22-6,
a Russian national,

concerning attempted murder and other offences

The 22nd Large Criminal Chamber of Landgericht Berlin I — sitting as a Schwurgericht (serious crimes chamber) — following the trial held from 25 August 2023 to 22 July 2024 over 28 hearings, in which the following participated:

at the hearing on 22 July 2024, in accordance with t h e l a w adjudged as follows:

On the defendant, for attempted murder in concurrence with attempted arson resulting in death (offences arising from one act), computer fraud, unlawful abstraction of electrical energy and criminal damage, an aggregate term of imprisonment of

5 (five) years and 4 (four) months

is imposed.

Confiscation of the value of proceeds of crime in the amount of 16.206,26 euros is ordered against the defendant.

The defendant shall bear the costs of the proceedings.

Reasons:

I. Introduction

The proceedings principally concern attempted murder in concurrence with attempted arson resulting in death (offences arising from one act) through the placement of an improvised explosive and incendiary device (“USBV”). The defendant, who is of Russian origin but politically opposed to the Putin regime, placed it outside a building on Lepsiusstraße in Berlin-Steglitz in April 2022 to drive out or even kill its residents — journalists working for Russian state television and their families. This did not succeed because the USBV did not function.

II. Personal circumstances

1. Biography

The defendant, who was 56 when the judgment was pronounced, was born in Moscow. There he studied at the Institute of Radio Engineering, Electronics and Automation, graduating in 1990 with an engineering diploma, and simultaneously studied journalism at Moscow State University. He then founded the “Politext” publishing house with his father, a mechanical engineer working in research. He first entered Germany in 1992. His father died that same year, whereupon the defendant closed the publishing house because he no longer wished to return to Russia. In 1993 he ultimately received an unlimited residence permit for the Federal Republic of Germany as a Jewish emigrant (a so-called quota refugee). He worked as a freelance journalist for Russian newspapers and otherwise supported himself through social assistance. From June 2000 to May 2003 he was held on remand and subsequently served a prison sentence, having been convicted of eight counts of fraud and sentenced to three years and eleven months’ imprisonment; that conviction has since been expunged. However, his expulsion was not pursued, and shortly afterwards he received an unlimited EU settlement permit with permission to work.

From 2006 to 2008, Dmitry Bagrash worked in Moscow as director of the representative office of a French company, Lohr Industrie S.A., a manufacturer of transport equipment. There, in 2008, he met Anna Bolotnaia, whom he married shortly before the birth of their son Max in August 2010. The family temporarily lived in the flat occupied by the defendant’s mother at Leibnizstraße 40 in Berlin-Charlottenburg before moving into their own flat in early 2011.

In the same year, the defendant, who said that he had meanwhile worked as a “strategy director” at an investment company, founded Rambach GmbH and, in parallel, a Russian subsidiary, Rambach Vostok. Both sold electronic products for chip tuning, meaning increasing vehicle performance. While the German company generated no significant profits for him, he succeeded in entering the Russian market by conducting car test drives as a journalist, identifying potential improvements and thus starting points for new developments. He sold his products through partnerships with Russian car dealerships and through an online shop to end consumers. In this way he initially built up a large following. However, as his products were mainly intended for luxury cars, his business collapsed as a result of state sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. In 2018, an employee also stole his financial reserves, equivalent to about 200.000 euros, so at the end of that year he decided to leave Russia and relocate his ongoing business to Berlin. To continue operating, however, differing technical requirements in Germany would have required extensive adaptations to his products and costly Dekra certificates that he could not afford. He still tried to earn profits from “off-the-books” orders, but without success. In spring 2020, he therefore took the opportunity to obtain state coronavirus emergency aid to which he was not entitled, and was still living on it most recently.

The defendant had always been politically active against the Putin regime, which his wife did not support out of concern for the family. Against this background, they decided to live separately, and Dmitry Bagrash moved back to Leibnizstraße 40 in May 2020. His mother had died in the meantime. The defendant’s marriage was dissolved in summer 2023, but he continues to maintain good contact with Anna Bolotnaia and their son.

2. Previous offending

The extract from the Bundeszentralregister (Federal Central Register) concerning the defendant shows one previous conviction. According to it, by penal order of Amtsgericht Tiergarten (Tiergarten Local Court) of 11 January 2021, for criminal trespass committed on 28 August 2020 — the defendant had entered an Edeka shop without a face covering, unlawfully filmed an employee and, despite

being asked to leave, had not done so — he was sentenced to a fine of 30 day-fine units of 30 euros each, which has since been enforced — 276 Cs 2/21 —.

3. Circumstances of detention

The defendant was arrested on 14 December 2022 under a detention warrant issued by Amtsgericht Tiergarten on 12 December 2022, which was revoked and reissued on 1 March 2023. Since then he has been held on remand at JVA Moabit, interrupted for one day on 29 December 2022 to serve the final outstanding day-fine unit of the above fine as imprisonment in default of payment. Continued detention was ordered on each occasion: by the Kammergericht (Berlin Higher Regional Court) on 14 July 2023, by the Chamber’s order opening the main proceedings on 28 July 2023, and again by the Chamber’s order of 20 December 2023 on the defendant’s application to lift the detention order during the ongoing trial.

III. Findings concerning the acts

1. Coronavirus emergency-aid fraud

On 1 April 2020, the defendant used the online form on the website of Investitionsbank Berlin (IBB; Berlin Investment Bank) to apply for so-called coronavirus emergency aid of 5.000 euros and additional support for ongoing business operating and financial expenses in the maximum amount of 9.000 euros provided for three consecutive months. The application form began with the following information:

“Under the programme of the Senate Department for Economics, Energy and Public Enterprises and the Federal Government, grants are provided to overcome an economic situation threatening the survival of a business or a liquidity shortfall arising in connection with the outbreak of COVID-19.

Eligible applicants are self-employed persons engaged in commercial activity without employees (Solo-Selbstständige) and micro-enterprises (including registered associations) with up to 10 employees in full-time equivalents and a place of business in Berlin, as well as members of the liberal professions based in Berlin who are registered with a German tax office.

For self-employed persons without employees and members of the liberal professions, self-employment must be their principal occupation.

Emergency aid amounts to 5.000 euros for applicants with up to 5 employees.

For ongoing business operating and financial expenses (commercial rent, lease payments, leasing expenses, etc.), applicants with up to 5 employees may apply for up to an additional 9.000 euros, and applicants with up to 10 employees for up to 15.000 euros.

Businesses whose liquidity shortfalls arose before 11.03.2020, such as undertakings in difficulty, are not eligible for support.”

When submitting the application, the defendant knowingly made the following untrue declarations in the respective preprinted sections of the form in order to obtain those payments. In fact, as he knew, he had no entitlement to them because his business had generated no turnover since 2018.

He declared that the grant was necessary to safeguard his professional or business existence during the coronavirus crisis through his company “Rambach Industrie GmbH”, established on 3 September 2012, register number HRB 133054 B, VAT ID DE 27825359, tax identification number 46815320397, based at Leibnizstraße 40, 10627 Berlin, in the sector “Trade, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles”, and that the economic situation threatening its survival was a consequence of the outbreak of COVID-19 in spring 2020.

He further declared that, before 31 December 2019, his business had not been an undertaking in difficulty within the meaning of Art. 2 Abs. 18 of the General Block Exemption Regulation; in particular, it had experienced no liquidity shortfalls or other economic difficulties before 31 December 2019, and no enforcement measures were currently pending. He stated the number of employees in his business as “1,00”.

He also gave the reason for the economic situation threatening the business’s survival or the liquidity shortfall as “Affected by partial closure and loss of turnover due to a lack of customers, cancellations and similar circumstances”, and declared that he pursued self-employment as a self-employed person without employees and a member of a liberal profession as his principal occupation. Finally, he ticked the following preprinted declaration:

“I am aware that facts relevant to the approval, award, recovery, continued award or retention of the grant are material to the subsidy within the meaning of § 264 of the Criminal Code and § 2 of the Subsidies Act in conjunction with § 1 of the Land Subsidies Act

. Facts material to the subsidy and changes to them must be reported to IBB without delay, truthfully and in full. (...) I declare in lieu of oath that I have provided all information to the best of my knowledge and belief and truthfully. Upon payment of the aid, approval is deemed to have been granted on the basis of that information. No separate decision will be issued.”

Following computer-assisted checking of the application, IBB transferred a total of 14.000 euros the next day to the account specified by the defendant, DE 90 1007 0024 0509 7985 00. No repayment to IBB has yet been made.

2. Unlawful abstraction of electrical energy

After moving back into the flat at Leibnizstraße 40 — rear building, 1st floor, left — in May 2020, the defendant discovered that same month that the incoming and outgoing cables at the flat’s electricity meter had been bridged, meaning it had been manipulated so that electricity consumption was not recorded. Knowing this and intending to gain a financial advantage, he consumed 7.879,5 kw/h of electricity without payment from no later than 31 May 2020 until his arrest on 14 December 2022, although he knew he had no entitlement to do so. This caused the electricity supplier Vattenfall Europe Sales GmbH a loss of 2.206,26 euros, which has not yet been compensated.

3. Placement of the improvised explosive and incendiary device (“USBV”)

a) Events beforehand

The defendant’s motivation to campaign against the Russian regime had already been fuelled at the end of 2018 by his personal negative experiences in his home country in connection with his business Rambach Vostok, and took on a new dimension in August 2020 with the poison attack on Alexei Navalny. The defendant was certain that the attacks on Crimea and individual opponents of the regime up to that point would not be the end of the matter. Thus, by this time at the latest, when his professional failure had also left him without other commitments, his everyday life had come to be dominated by the

aim of drawing public attention, particularly that of the German government, to the danger posed by Putin. Against this background, he subsequently held several public events in Berlin with like-minded people, beginning with a demonstration under the slogan “Freedom for Navalny” outside the Russian embassy in late summer 2020. To store equipment for his events, from spring 2021 he used, in addition to his flat on Leibnizstraße, workshop premises in Biesenthal (Brandenburg) rented from an acquaintance, the witness Ion Pavlenko.

On 23 February 2021, the defendant founded the association “Unkremlin” e.V. together with other members, thereby formally committing himself to his existing objective. The association was primarily intended to support people harmed by the Russian government through public information and fundraising.

From 9 April to 9 May 2021, he held a vigil outside the Brandenburg Gate, displaying, among other things, photographs of people killed in attacks by the Russian regime. The First Channel of Russian television, comparable to the relevant public-service news broadcasters in Germany, reported on this, stating, among other things:

“How to organise a festival of hatred against Russia:

A handful of activists from Germany who have followed in the footsteps of the mastodon of anti-Russian rhetoric have decided to stage their own little action in the highly-likely style, only in German. The setting is central Berlin. What makes the situation particularly cynical is that it will last until 9 May. Our correspondent Ivan Blagoy tried to understand whether they really mean it and who these strange people are. (...) This looks like another prank by Ukrainian migrants, who are welcomed in Germany in abundance. They bring this fervour with them and believe that wherever they are, they can stage a festival of utterly unlawful actions and the like, provided that a) they are noticed and b) there is always someone to pay for it. (...) The video about the action was filmed by a certain Dmitry Bagrash, who lives in Germany and sells electronic assemblies for cars. On his company’s Facebook page, however, the video is about Putin rather than products. There are not many reviews of the company either. (...) The organisers are not troubled by the fact that German police used water cannon in the autumn to forcibly disperse opponents of quarantine restrictions at the Brandenburg Gate. Apparently, the Berlin authorities are not embarrassed by this either. (...) If, loosely speaking, you take an anti-Putin stance, as the European press puts it today, you naturally receive permission and a police escort. (...) All kinds of assemblies,

rallies and vigils are generally prohibited, but if you support a policy that destroys the Russian state, then you are welcome to hold such vigils.”

In addition, Alexander Karlov, known in Russia as a patriot, shortly afterwards posted an item about the defendant and that event on the “Ru- Tube” platform under the title “Who is this fighter against the regime?”, stating in substance as follows:

“Hello, my name is Alexander Karlov, and today I will tell you how to become a fighter against the regime — not just some armchair warrior, but a real one, albeit in emigration. I would like to introduce a classmate of mine: His name is Dmitry Bagrash. We attended the same class at Special School No. 61 with advanced English teaching. (...) Dmitry now lives in Germany. We became Facebook friends about three years ago. Last summer he sent me this photograph, in which he is angrily protesting against Navalny’s murderers. When I asked him, ‘Do you have investigation results?’, he answered, ‘Investigations into what?’

A month ago, however, I came across this message in my Facebook newsfeed: ‘Hello, my name is Dmitri Bagrash. I am a co-organiser of the “Stop Putin’s Terror!” campaign. From 9 April to 9 May 2021, we are setting up a 24-hour tent camp in Berlin near the Brandenburg Gate. We will spend an entire month 130 metres from the Reichstag. The aim is to visibly draw the attention of the leadership of Germany and the European Union, all people and journalists, to the current problem and the threat posed by the Kremlin regime. The location is not accidental either: Every day on their way to work, parliamentarians will walk through an “avenue of Putin’s victims”, including European victims. And through a series of compelling arguments about the extreme danger the Kremlin poses to them today. We will urge them to act much more decisively!’ Wow, I thought, so Dmitry is a real fighter, and what a fighter! No more, no less. He has set out to defend peaceful Europe against the terrible Kremlin. He knows the names of all Putin’s victims; he has compelling arguments — not evidence, but compelling arguments. He forces German parliamentarians to show resolve. To be convincing, as one should, he draws parallels between the Third Reich and today’s Russia. (...) Dima now works for unKremlin, an NGO — not even an organisation, but a Facebook page organising such actions in Berlin. They even have a slogan: ‘Let's unKremlin us together!’ That is cool! Translated from English, it means: ‘Let us unKremlin together!’ I would help, but how do I get you all together? Then you could not only be ‘un-Kremlined’, but also ‘Reichstagged together’, ‘un-Brandenburg-Gated’ and ‘de-Berlined’ in a controlled manner. I am only joking! The announced action even made it onto the First Channel of Russian television and NTV, but for unknown reasons brought the organisers no dividends. On the action’s resources I see nothing about an increase in viewers or subscribers. Besides, I certainly will not fear that this story of mine pours a bucket of water onto the mills of the Gremlins of Unkremlins. (...)

Well, Dima, if one believes what you believe, you are in serious trouble! Look: Following your logic and the evidence-based initiatives you cite, the elites could just as well drown you in a bathtub with Novichok. Because, once again, according to your fears, Litvinenko, the Skripals, the Salisbury cat, two hamsters and a few tramps, and even Navalny, set themselves less ambitious goals. Are you not afraid, Dima? Again — just a joke, for the second time! (...) By the way, Dima, a question: ‘Does Maxim Dmitrijewitsch know how his father earns his money? Have you told him? And does he support you?’

In September 2021, another event followed outside the Russian embassy, organised by the defendant under the slogan “Putin is a killer”.

On 24 February 2022, the Russian attack on Ukraine began. In a Facebook post that same day, the defendant expressed his anger and frustration that his efforts had not been taken seriously and that this war crime had not been prevented as follows:

“Talking and getting upset is now pointless and too late!

I was born in Moscow and also bear responsibility for THIS. For letting that bastard come to power.

Now we have to act. How? I do not yet know myself... There are only a few options so far. Everything depends on the reaction of the West and NATO.

So far, I see the following options for myself:

• Go to Ukraine as a volunteer fighter
• Paralyse as far as possible all RF (Russian Federation) facilities and structures belonging to pro-Putin businesspeople in Germany
• Apply maximum pressure on the government of Germany and the European Union for a military response to putin and military aid for Ukraine. But only if there is a realistic chance of success through that pressure. Simply standing around with banners and little flags is pointless!
• We, citizens of Russia, must approach the German government with a demand for a military response to putin and thereby, on behalf of Russian citizens, “legitimise” the need for active MILITARY action.

I will wait 3-5 hours. Then comes the choice of an option and action. Are there other options? Write to me!”

The defendant replied as follows to a related comment by another Facebook user:

“Sergej! Thank you for the comment, particularly concerning civic duty. You have given me an idea — I will try to find the military ID I carried in my pocket for 2 years in the Soviet Army, so that I can burn it. I do not want to have, and will not have, anything to do with the fascist army and the fascist country. As long as a junta of psychopaths rules there, I consider it my duty to fight it with all my strength.”

On 2 March 2022, the defendant drove his BMW to Lepsiusstraße 103 in Berlin-Steglitz, the later scene of the offence. He had found out that the property and the building on it belonged to the Russian Federation and were made available to employees of a Russian state television broadcaster — Ria Novosti — as living and working premises.

The building is a detached, two-storey older property with a broad frontage of windows facing the street on the ground and first floors. At that time the basement and ground-floor rooms were used communally, while all living and working rooms were on the first floor and arranged as follows: The witness Basirov occupied the four-room flat facing the street; the other occupants — the witness Feoktistov with his wife and daughter, and the witness Timofeeva with her daughter — lived in the flat facing the side of the building or the rear courtyard. The defendant, who had never entered the building, did not know this layout.

The property is separated from the street by a stone wall about one metre high, topped by a fence about 80 cm high, allowing unauthorised persons to climb over it. The entrance gates — by the intercom for visitors and at the vehicle entrance — are also generally unlocked.

On arrival, the defendant encountered one of those residents, the witness Insaf Basirov. A year earlier, during the vigil at the Brandenburg Gate, Basirov had become aware of Dmitry Bagrash as an opponent of Putin and now recognised him. Given the defendant’s political views, which the witness therefore knew, and the Russian war against Ukraine that had begun shortly before, the witness regarded Dmitry Bagrash with suspicion as he used his phone to photograph the residential building and its doorbell panel with the residents’ individual names. Asked by the witness what he was doing there, the defendant replied that he was a journalist and left. Before that, the witness Basirov had taken a photograph of the defendant, who, back in his vehicle, was showing the witness his middle finger.

The following day, the defendant posted the following items on his Facebook profile, attaching one of the photographs he had taken of the building at Lepsiusstraße 103:

“The property in Berlin belongs to the Russian Federation.

Address: Lepsius Str. 103, 12165 Berlin. According to the land registry, this property previously belonged to the Soviet Union. Its present owner is the Russian Federation.

Who lives there? Russian journalists-propagandists/propaganda arseholes. Sputnik, for example. They do not just live there; they also “work” there. From there they wage war against all of us.

For non-Berliners: This is one of Berlin’s most sought-after neighbourhoods. A sort of “satellite” district for the wealthy elite.

Jurij Schulipa, please develop a legal algorithm for transferring Russian property to Ukraine or, damn it, simply sweeping them out with a dirty broom. Ichkerians, write this address of the Russian snakes’ nest in your notebooks.

What Russian citizens can do for Ukraine today and why I am not organising street protests: I will not call on Russian citizens to take to the streets — I have no moral right to do so. I am in Berlin.

Outside Russia

• Transfer money in any way
• Find a collection point for humanitarian aid near you
• Help receive refugees
• Take part in organising aid
• Find Russian infrastructure facilities and hold protests there. So that the ground burns beneath the feet of KGB people
• Spread information in Russia as widely as possible and by every available means about the fate of soldiers who have died or been captured
• Explain to the intellectually virginal “patriots” from Russia that the homeland they are trying to defend is a group of crazed criminals headed by putin”

In the period that followed, unknown persons repeatedly threw bottles and eggs at the building on Lepsiusstraße.

On 11 March 2022, the defendant published the following letter he had written to the Ukrainian military:

“Forwarded message from Dmitriy Bagrash to the Ukrainian armed forces.

Greetings. My name is Dmitriy Bagrash. I was born in Moscow.

I have lived in Berlin, Germany, since 1992.

I ask to be accepted into the international legion for the defence of Ukraine. I served in the Soviet army from 1986 to 1988.

I ask you to make an exception and send me the instructions.

I also bear shared responsibility for the genocide of Ukrainians by the Russian fascist horde. Give me the opportunity to repel them with a weapon in my hands.

I am writing in Russian. Sorry.

My social media profile, I hope, leaves no doubt about my attitude to the Kremlin — (...) I am also one of the organisers of the unKremlin association in Germany (...) P.S. I ask to be accepted as a volunteer fighter. Any remuneration is categorically EXCLUDED!

GLORY TO UKRAINE!”

The Ukrainian government did not grant this request; instead, Dmitry Bagrash was advised to support Ukraine from Germany.

Another post by the defendant on the same day reads as follows:

“Compatriots, damn it, dream of having a PRESIDENT like that! Glory to Ukraine! Putin, you fucking dick, filthy Kremlin dwarf, burn in hell!

I, a citizen of Russia, Dmitrij Bagrasch, will never forgive you for the women and children who died in Mariupol. I will not forgive you, you piece of filth from St Petersburg, for the plea of Gennadij Mochnenko, the priest from Mariupol who asked you for help during the bombing of peaceful CHILDREN... All your soldiers, you, you bald bastard... I will pursue and destroy until the end of my life! I am no less a legal nihilist than you, you bastard... just wait, you piece of filth! Everyone, everyone, everyone involved — the e-Billings exist along the entire vertical hierarchy!”

b) Planning and commission of the act

During these days, the defendant decided to gain the attention he had not yet received by means other than peaceful protest, namely through an attack on the building at Lepsiusstraße 103 and its occupants. For this purpose, he developed an incendiary-device design, which he then made — alone or together with one or more unknown co-perpetrators.

Externally, it consisted mainly of a 10-litre AdBlue canister, with a 2-litre Coca-Cola bottle secured horizontally to its top with adhesive tape and a bundle of matches with twelve connected barbecue firelighter cubes secured to the bottle. Both containers were almost completely filled with a mixture of used oil, in principle readily combustible, containing unknown proportions of diesel and petrol. A 227g propane gas cartridge of the kind commonly used for camping gas stoves was attached to the side of the canister. Because the canister’s handle was taped over, a white-sheathed cable about one metre long, attached there in a loop, served as a carrying device.

To ignite that liquid, the defendant had installed electronics consisting of a control circuit and a working circuit. A 9-V battery served as the power source, with a cable attached to each of its two terminals; these two cables, together with a thin uninsulated wire, ran through a terminal block to the bundle of matches and barbecue firelighter cubes.

To activate the battery, a plastic box containing three 1.5-V batteries was connected via a circuit-board kit to the construction just described, which served as the working circuit. Like the mechanism of a commercially available string of lights, it allowed switching to be delayed for a predetermined period of a few hours and thus served as a timer fuse. The functions of the other electronic components installed on the circuit board could no longer be established afterwards. It was, however, likely that a remote fuse had additionally been installed with further components ensuring signal reception.

When the working circuit was started, the two cables were intended to heat the wire located together with them in the very confined space inside the terminal block until it glowed, so that it would ignite the matches and the barbecue firelighters would catalyse the fire. The defendant assumed that the fire would melt the plastic containers, thereby also igniting the liquid inside them. He had installed the gas cartridge so that its heat-induced reaction would cause an explosion and thus further spread the fire.

With this improvised explosive and incendiary device (hereafter: USBV), the defendant drove his BMW to Lepsiusstraße 103 on the evening of 23 April 2022. At around 23.50, he entered the property through the unlocked gate by the doorbell panel. He activated the timer fuse and placed the incendiary device in the basement light well on the right when the building is viewed from above. This is 1.05 m long, 0.43 m wide and ‚of 1.25 m in depth. To do this, he removed the metal grille resting loosely on the well and lowered the USBV using an extension to the cable loop that had been tied to it by this point at the latest, namely a

gauze bandage/dressing about 1.40 m long. He then closed the well again with the metal grille.

The defendant envisaged that the USBV would react as described and assumed that the explosion of the gas cartridge would shatter the basement window, allowing the fire into the house, or that the building itself would catch fire via the outer wall. In this way, he wanted at least to frighten the occupants — “propagandists” of the Russian regime whom he hated — in order to drive them permanently out of the house and, at best, out of Germany. However, he at least accepted the possibility that one or more of them could be injured by the fire or even die — probably in their sleep from smoke-gas poisoning — and reconciled himself to this. He was also aware that at the intended time of the reaction, at night or early in the morning, the occupants would not expect an attack on their life or bodily integrity.

From his flat on the first floor above ground level, the witness Insaf Basirov heard the noise associated with lowering the USBV and then looked outside through his kitchen window. He observed the defendant leaving the property again, but did not recognise him as Dmitry Bagrash because of the darkness and distance. The witness initially assumed it was a stranger who had used the property’s refuse bins and stepped back again. Meanwhile, the defendant took a can of red spray paint from his vehicle and used it to write an inscription in Russian on the side wall of the house adjoining the right-hand side of the basement light well — translated as “Rashists to hell!” Insaf Basirov was again alerted by the spraying noise to the person on the property who was unknown to him. He opened his kitchen window, shone his mobile phone’s torch outside and called “Run!” in Russian after the defendant, who was already leaving. During his observations, the witness also recorded two mobile phone videos, but these were unsuitable for anthropological analysis.

Contrary to the expectations of the defendant, who drove back to Leibnizstraße, the incendiary device did not react, because either the electronics were already not functioning as intended or, at least, the oxygen supply in the well was too low to sustain a fire capable of setting the building alight.

A few hours later, at around 7 o’clock the following day, the defendant again drove to the scene in his car to check whether his plan had succeeded. On arriving and seeing that this was apparently not the case, he probably activated the remote fuse that had additionally been installed — although its installation could not be established with certainty — and left again. Back home, he repeatedly searched online, using the search terms “berlin lepsiusstrasse” and “lepsiusstrasse 103, berlin”, for internet articles that, in the event of successful activation, he

expected to find; he entered the corresponding queries in Google on his Asus notebook at 8.23, 14.29 and 14.59. He made another 17 identical Google searches on his Macbook that day between 8.23.38 and 16.31.35. However, because the USBV still did not activate and initially was not discovered either, no corresponding media reports appeared.

c) Events after the act

On 6 May 2022 at around 16:00, a man unknown at the time, who had no connection whatsoever with the defendant, threw a beer bottle from the street and broke one of the windows of the witness Basirov’s flat in protest against Russia’s war of aggression. After the police officers who had been called recorded the circumstances and had already left again, the witness Feoktistova swept up the glass fragments on the property and discovered the USBV in the basement light well. Since the object appeared threatening to the occupants, they called the police again. At the scene, the officers then called in the witness and expert, senior criminal police inspector Wohlgemuth (KOK) of LKA KTI 241, who specialised in defusing improvised explosive and incendiary devices. He classified the USBV as potentially dangerous, so he recovered it from the well under the strictest safety precautions and made an X-ray image to allow better assessment and later reconstruction of its design. Since even after this closer inspection he continued to regard it as potentially dangerous and therefore considered transport to the Berlin demolition site in Grunewald too risky, he destroyed the incendiary device at the scene using a water-pressure device to defuse it. The officers subsequently seized various individual parts of the USBV that had been scattered around the site by the defusing operation.

From 27 June to 28 September 2022, the defendant organised another “protest camp” opposite the Federal Chancellery. In a Facebook post of 1 December of the same year, he also continued to express his political position as follows:

“Furthermore, Putin and his. entourage must be eliminated pre-emptively, while still at the stage of preparing a nuclear attack. (...) The general part of the criminal codes of every country in the world contains a provision called ‘extreme necessity’, which reinforces the effect of a fundamental principle: ‘A punishable act whose commission prevents the commission of a greater crime is not regarded as a crime’. That is, it is better to eliminate one bastard, his followers and his entourage than to wait for that bastard to eliminate hundreds of thousands more people, possibly millions.”

4. Tampering with the gas pipe

After the utility company GASAG AG cut off the gas supply to the defendant’s flat at Leibnizstraße 40 on 10 October 2022 because he had not paid outstanding bills, he decided to restore the supply on his own authority. For this purpose, on a day that cannot be determined more precisely between 24 November and 14 December 2022, he drilled into the riser supplying gas to the residential building and the flat’s supply pipe and connected the points with a copper pipe, bypassing the gas meter. He then enclosed the area around the gas meter with plasterboard to conceal the tampering.

This was discovered during his arrest and the search of the flat on 14 December 2022. Since danger to other occupants of the building could not be ruled out, the gas supply to the entire building had to be shut off that same day. The tampering was remedied on 21 December 2022, so the house remained unheated for a week and was therefore uninhabitable. The occupants consequently had to move out for that period, which was likely to involve considerable inconvenience and costs, particularly as winter temperatures in Berlin were below freezing during those days.

IV. Assessment of the evidence

1. Opening statement and the defendant’s account at trial

In an ‘opening statement’ (a statement on the charge under § 243 Abs. 5 Satz 3 StPO), the defence submitted on behalf of the defendant at the second trial hearing on 13 September 2023, in essence, that his political activity as a Russian citizen in support of Ukraine had brought him to the attention of Russian domestic and foreign authorities. This had already been the case in 2021, as numerous items on Russian television or social media showed. From early March 2022 until his arrest in December, the defendant had housed a total of about 60 Ukrainian refugees in his flat, whose personal details he generally did not record. He had also made his car available to many people. Accordingly, some people had access to objects that he also used, particularly possible later components of the USBV and electronic devices for which, according to the indictment, mobile-cell connections had been recorded in the area of the scene. These people therefore came into consideration as possible alternative perpetrators, and the act might have been committed deliberately to remove the defendant as an unwelcome opponent of the regime.

On the tenth day of the trial, the defendant finally had his defence lawyers read out a prepared written account in which, alongside information on his professional background, he admitted the acts alleged against him, except for placing the USBV.

As regards the unlawful taking of electrical energy, contrary to the allegation in the indictment that he had himself carried out the underlying tampering with the electricity meter, he stated that he had moved into the flat at Leibnizstraße 40 in May 2020; he had then noticed the meter bypass quite quickly, left it as it was and thus paid nothing for his electricity consumption until his arrest.

2. Assessment of the evidence in the narrower sense

a) Personal circumstances

The defendant addressed his personal circumstances in his written account and supplemented it with a written statement and orally at trial. Further information is based on an analysis report of his immigration file prepared by criminal police inspector Rink (KK’in).

b) Findings on the main charge (placing the USBV)

aa) Perpetration by the defendant

The chamber assessed the available circumstantial evidence against the hypothesis of one or more alternative perpetrators, but considers that hypothesis refuted by an overall assessment of the results of the examination of evidence.

(1) Circumstantial evidence concerning the defendant’s person

First, the defendant’s political motivation, his connection to the target of the act, and the chamber’s conviction that his professional background made him capable of designing and building the USBV supported the conclusion that he had committed the act.

The defendant himself consistently presented the account that he had always opposed the Putin regime and dedicated himself to drawing public attention to its danger, from his statements during the investigation through to his final statement. The established contents of his Facebook posts are based on their written translations, which — as the witness, criminal police inspector Schulze (KK’in), testified — had been assigned during the investigation to female interpreters sworn in under a general oath. From these publications, the chamber also discerned the defendant’s personal connection to the later target of the act and his anger towards the ‘propagandists’ living and working there, as well as his hatred-filled aversion to the Russian president.

In this regard, the witness Sarah Sander — a person sharing his political views and a member of UnKremlin e.V. — testified that the defendant had wanted to take active steps against the ‘propagandists’; even before the attack on Ukraine, he had foreseen that such a war crime would occur.

The witness Basirov testified, as established, to the visit to the building at Lepsiusstraße 103 a few weeks before the act. The photographs of the building and doorbell nameplate taken by the defendant on that occasion were recovered from his I-Phone during its analysis, as the witness assigned to that task, criminal police inspector Kittner (KK), reported at trial.

In assessing these features pointing to the defendant as the perpetrator, the chamber considered that all this was known through his own account on Facebook and, not least, Russian media coverage, and could therefore be exploited accordingly — in the sense of his hypothesis that the act might deliberately have been ‘pinned on him’.

On the other hand, the Russian-language inscription ‘Rashists to hell!’ placed on the building while the USBV was being positioned was also taken into account. The investigating officers commissioned the interpreter Boelter-Fatkoulina, whom the chamber also heard as a linguistic expert, to translate this graffiti. When questioned about this term during his examination as a witness on 13 September 2022, the defendant himself stated that it was a newly coined word for ‘Russian fascists’ that had been used internationally since the war in Ukraine. In connection with this inscription, expressions that the defendant had also used during police interviews attracted attention. As the witness, criminal police inspector Weiß (KK), testified, this concerned, first, the interview of 13 September 2022, in which he recounted his encounter with Insaf Basirov at the later scene of the act and stated that, when the witness asked what he — the defendant — was doing there, he replied, ‘Go to hell’. Furthermore, according to the witness Weiß, the defendant had, during his

interview as a suspect on 28 December 2022, stated that he had eventually ‘sent to hell’ two of the people he had housed in his flat — Anna Tarasova and Oleksandr Tarasov — in the sense of ‘told them to leave his flat’.

Since this is not a widely used form of expression, the chamber treated the use of this phrase as circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s perpetration and his intention to send those ‘Rashists to hell’. The defendant’s Facebook posts of 3 and 11 March 2022 were also assessed in this evidential direction because of their connection to the subject of ‘fire’ (‘Find objects of Russian infrastructure and carry out protest actions there. So that the ground burns beneath the feet of KGB people’; ‘Putin, you fucking dick, filthy Kremlin dwarf, burn in hell!’).

(2) Circumstantial evidence concerning the USBV

(a) Investigative findings on the origin of individual components

As regards the individual components, a connection to the defendant was established concerning the Ad- Blue canister and the gas cartridge.

The defendant had recognised the canister as his from a photograph shown to him by his defence lawyer at the time — as, according to criminal police inspector Weiß (KK), he had stated in his interview as a suspect on 28 December 2022. It had been stored in the boot of his BMW and had disappeared one day. However, this statement appeared to have little evidential value in itself, since the defendant dated its disappearance to a period after the act: the canister had been in the boot ‘until at least the end of April 2022’.

Concerning the gas cartridge, the witness, chief criminal police inspector Webs (KHK), had established during analysis of the defendant’s email accounts that he had ordered 20 such cartridges and a gas stove through ebay to his home address, where, according to the associated delivery note, they arrived on 12 April 2021. The witness also testified that a cartridge of the same brand as the one installed in the USBV had been seized during a search of workshop premises in Biesenthal attributed to the defendant. As the witness, criminal police inspector Ambrosi (KK’in), reported at trial, both cartridges bore a printed sequence of digits on the bottom — probably a consecutive serial number — differing by only one digit (20100919 and 20100920). The chamber was convinced that this suggested that the USBV’s cartridge came from the defendant’s identified order.

Concerning those workshop premises, the witness Ion Pavlenco testified at trial that he had moved his transport business there in spring 2021. From that same time, he had made part of the premises available to Dmitry Bagrash, where the defendant then stored technical equipment and items for his political events.

In this regard too, the chamber took into account that these findings had no substantial evidential value, since they concerned everyday objects that could also have been stolen from the defendant to build the USBV — deliberately or otherwise. In this connection, the witness David Retschke, among others, stated that camping gas stoves had been used at the multi-day camps organised by the defendant.

(b) DNA trace evidence

The chamber relied on the results of DNA testing of the seized USBV components as a key item of circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s perpetration.

On this point, the expert in forensic DNA analysis Dr. Schelbert explained that comparison of the DNA traces extracted from the objects and amplified had produced matches with the characteristic pattern of reference sample 20-RC186-9 attributable to the defendant.

As regards the mixed profile in trace sample EAV21AFU401P S12.11 (USBV, white gauze, knot opened, surface), the defendant came into consideration as the source of the dominant component because of matching characteristics in all 16 marker systems examined and amelogenin. For a biostatistical assessment of the probability that the trace originated from the defendant, two hypotheses had been compared. Hypothesis A assumed that these DNA characteristics came from the defendant, whereas hypothesis B assumed that the source was another person not closely related to the defendant. The characteristics detected in the trace in question were more than 30 billion times more likely to be observed if hypothesis A was true than if hypothesis B was true. From the expert’s perspective, there was therefore no justified doubt that the characteristics of the dominant component of the examined mixed profile of that trace sample came from the defendant.

For further trace samples as well, namely on the white-sheathed cable, metal parts, a piece of circuit board, the battery clip, fragments of adhesive tape and the rim of the

Coca-Cola bottle cap, the defendant came into consideration as a contributor to the detected mixed profiles. These traces were, however, quantitatively slight, which was to be expected given the water-jet impact and the solubility of DNA in water.

Because of this external impact, the original locations where the DNA was found could not be reconstructed with certainty either. The recovered DNA therefore need not originally have been on the specified USBV components, but could equally have been dissolved by the water and carried from one point on the USBV to another. On the other hand, according to Dr. Schelbert, the highest-quality DNA trace of all, on the gauze knot, was readily explained by the fact that making such a knot requires close skin contact and thus produces a large amount of trace material. Despite the uncertainties set out by the expert, this allowed the chamber to conclude that the defendant had at least come into contact with the gauze loop.

In this regard too, it was taken into account that the DNA trace alone establishes only the defendant’s contact with that particular component. However, as regards the gauze loop, it had to be considered that such dressings are generally individually packaged to be disposed of after a single intended use — treating skin injuries.

Against this background, it was not very plausible to assume that the defendant had used the dressing in a way that deposited DNA traces, but another person had then deliberately reused it to build the USBV. Insofar as the defence submitted on his behalf that he had suffered a scald injury to his foot during his camp in spring 2021 and used corresponding dressing material to treat it — which was confirmed by the examination of evidence, particularly the testimony of the witness Sander — it would be far-fetched to believe that another person had ‘secured’ such a dressing, possibly still coated with wound ointment, and kept it to build the USBV about a year later.

The witness and expert, senior criminal police inspector Wohlgemuth (KOK), who had still been able to inspect the USBV in its original form, assessed this gauze arrangement as serving to lower the USBV into the basement light well. The chamber found this readily understandable from several photographs of the original USBV (Sonderband 1 Fach 11 Bl. 5 (pdf. Bi. 455); Sonderband 8 Fach 1 Bl. 9 (pdf. Bl. 12)), to which reference is made for the details.

Insofar as the defence expressed doubts about the admissibility of the DNA sample taken on 13 September 2022 following the defendant’s first examination as a witness, the chamber was convinced that these doubts had been refuted by the statements of the interviewing officer,

criminal police inspector Weiß (KK). He testified that the defendant had acquired suspect status only after the DNA match in question emerged. The defendant had been comprehensively advised at the outset of his witness interviews, including under § 55 StPO; at that stage, he — Weiß (KK) — and his colleagues had not yet formed any hypothesis as to who the perpetrator was. As one of the affected occupants of Lepsiusstraße 103, the witness Basirov had pointed to the defendant’s Facebook posts, knowing him personally from his event at the Brandenburger Tor. During the investigation, DNA samples had been requested from almost all witnesses, as was confirmed by the examination of evidence. Accordingly, after that examination as a witness, the defendant too had been asked whether he was willing to provide DNA voluntarily in order to exclude him as the source of traces. The defendant had agreed.

The supposition that one or more co-perpetrators might have been involved in the act is based on the discovery of further DNA traces on USBV components. According to Dr. Schelbert’s explanations, another man who remained unknown came into consideration as a contributor to the characteristic profiles of a series of trace samples, particularly the white-sheathed cable, the gauze, pieces of adhesive tape and the thread around the matches. Moreover, matches for another unknown man and an unknown woman had occurred in two trace samples — the thread/drinking rim of the Coca-Cola bottle cap and the adhesive tape attached to the gas cartridge.

(3) The presence of the defendant’s BMW at the scene

The findings concerning the presence of the defendant’s BMW (official registration number B-EC 605) at the scene between 23 and 24 April 2022 are based on the corresponding testimony of the witness, chief criminal police inspector Schumann (KHK).

Using the MSISDN supplied by BMW — the specific identifier of a vehicle within a mobile network — he analysed when the vehicle had been in the mobile cell covering Lepsiusstraße 103 during the analysis period from 19 April to 6 May 2022. The witness compiled the results in a table and explained that the respective start time described the moment when the SIM card installed in the vehicle was first supplied with power, through starting the engine, and thereby activated. The end time, by contrast, was not reliable. The start times established for 24 April 2022 were 0.15, 7.18 and 7.22.

As regards the night-time period, this showed, consistently with the testimony of the witness Basirov, that the BMW was started at 0.15 on the night of the act — probably for the return journey — and, as established, was again within that same mobile cell that morning. From the latter fact, the chamber concluded that the defendant intended activation during the night or early morning and that this renewed visit to the scene served to check the success of his plan.

That the car was the defendant’s was stated by him in his examination as a witness on 13 September 2022, and was also confirmed by a check of vehicles registered to him carried out by criminal police inspector Weiß (KK), and by the photograph of the defendant taken by the witness Basirov on 2 March 2022.

In this regard too, the chamber considered that the defendant’s vehicle need not have been used by him personally at the times in question. His opening statement said that from March 2022 until his arrest in December he had housed about 60 people and had sometimes also allowed them to use his vehicle. The chamber regarded as credible the fact that, after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the defendant had accommodated war refugees and others sharing his political views. In this connection, the witness, criminal police inspector Rink (KK’in), stated that the circumstances found during the search of the flat at Leibnizstraße 40 — at least two sleeping places and several toothbrushes in the bathroom — indicated that people other than the defendant alone had stayed there.

Witnesses, for example Christoph Wiedemann, also testified that the defendant generally made the BMW available when needed to other people, including people who did not live with him but participated in his events.

However, as to how the vehicle was lent, the defendant stated during his interview as a suspect on 28 December 2022 — as KK Weiß testified — that in April 2022 only Oleksandr Tarasov, Ukrainian activists and he himself had access to the BMW. He, the defendant, had only one key to the vehicle and handed it over when someone wanted to use the car. Oleksandr had used it approximately three to six times in April 2022, and the activists concerned approximately two or three times during March / April. They generally borrowed the BMW only in the evenings, always returned after about three hours and gave him back the key. Later in the same interview, he contradicted this by stating that, between April and September 2022, the persons whom he eventually identified by name had sometimes used the BMW in his absence.

At least the defendant's initial account did not suggest that others used the BMW without his control. This was also contradicted by his statement in that interview that one of the reasons he had told Oleksandr Tarasov to leave his flat was that the latter frequently failed to refuel after borrowing the car; the defendant was therefore evidently able to link the person using it to the fuel shortfall he subsequently noticed.

Against this background, it would have been natural to assume that the defendant would also have remembered someone else using his BMW during the period of the offence and would have been able to identify that person, particularly since, for one thing, it was a notably late or early hour. For another, the defendant had dated the occasion on which he told the “Tarasovs” to leave his flat to the end of April, which would also have been a plausible memory anchor for use by another person during the night of 23 to 24 April 2022.

(4) Search queries relating to the offence

The findings on the defendant's internet searches concerning Lepsiusstraße on 24 April 2022 are based on the corresponding analysis reports by the witnesses KK Bongard and KOK Leisner, who also gave supplementary evidence on this matter.

In this regard, KK Bongard stated that the devices concerned were an Asus laptop and a Macbook seized during the search of the defendant's flat.

As regards the use of these electronic devices, the possibility that they had been used by third parties also had to be considered in principle. However, the Chamber was persuaded otherwise by the fact that, while the Macbook was in use on 24 April 2022 between 8.23 and 16.31 — a device used exclusively by the defendant himself, according to his interview as a suspect on 28 December 2022 — an enquiry into transactions on the defendant's Berliner Sparkasse account (15.06) took place in close temporal proximity to one of the 17 searches for Lepsiusstraße (14.59). According to the witness Bongard, this required personal access credentials (account number and PIN). The defendant did not even himself claim that someone else had made this enquiry, and thus that he had disclosed those credentials — nor was this investigative finding addressed in the closing submissions or his final statement — and that would not have been a realistic assumption either. Against this background, the Chamber was satisfied that the defendant had carried out the searches concerned himself in order, as found, to determine whether there were news reports about the

target of the offence, and thus whether his plan had succeeded. There was no indication that he was expecting reports of other events connected with Lepsiusstraße.

(5) Conclusion

Finally, the Chamber did not disregard the media coverage submitted by the defence in its assessment. The video excerpts were translated by the interpreter Mr Kurjatow, who gave evidence as a language expert on the background circumstances established. As to timing, the news coverage showed that it appeared while the defendant was still holding his vigil in spring 2021; Alexander Karlov's contribution is also likely to have been published during that period, given its references to the Facebook newsfeed and the television report. In substance, however — while the threatening tendency of Alexander Karlov's contribution, including towards the defendant's son, cannot be denied — the predominant message was that Dmitry Bagrash and opponents of that regime generally did not seem to be taken seriously. Their conduct was criticised for denouncing breaches of the law by Putin — purported breaches from that perspective — without evidence and while themselves disregarding the law in force.

Furthermore, this made clear that the Russian regime had apparently become aware of the defendant as early as spring 2021, which raises the question of why it would have waited another year before “framing” him for an offence. Rather, the placement of the USBV a few weeks after Russia's attack on Ukraine suggested to the Chamber that this event had been “the last straw” for the defendant.

Having weighed and assessed all of this, the Chamber was satisfied, to the degree required for conviction, that the defendant was the perpetrator.

bb) Further assessment of the evidence

(1) Findings concerning the building at Lepsiusstraße 103 and the graffiti inscription

The findings concerning the building at Lepsiusstraße 103 and the graffiti on its side wall are based principally on the testimony of the witness Basirov, who discovered the inscription on 24 April 2022, and on the scene plan (extracts), special volume 1, section 6

envelope, p. 1 (pdf. p. 393), and the photographs in special volume 1, section 7, p. 16 (pdf. p. 423), section 8, pp. 8 and 9 (pdf. pp. 442, 443), to which supplementary reference is made for the details.

There was no indication that the defendant had ever entered the building and thus knew the established layout of its floors and rooms.

The residents heard as witnesses were able to testify in this regard that they had never let the defendant into the building.

(2) Structure and construction of the USBV / mode of operation intended by the defendant

The structure of the USBV and the intended mode of operation as found are based on the evidence of the experts KOK Wohlgemuth and Mr Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Blumberg, and the witness KHK Warmuth.

(a) Evidence of the “USBV experts” and the explosives investigator dealing with the case

KOK Wohlgemuth specialises in rendering so-called USBVs safe at LKA KTI 241 and has worked exclusively in this field since 2019. After progressing professionally to the rank of Kriminaloberkommissar, he completed two years of bomb-disposal training and has continued to undertake further training in this field. He testified that he had been called in this capacity to Lepsiusstraße 103 on 6 May 2022 because a suspicious object, thought to be a USBV, had been found there. He went there with a colleague and, drawing on his expertise and everyday professional experience, classified the construction concerned as potentially dangerous. He therefore wore a protective suit designed for such cases to recover the object from the basement shaft. He then took an X-ray of the USBV to understand its structure. Inspection of the X-ray confirmed his assessment that there was a danger to the life and physical safety of those present, and he therefore decided to render it safe using a water-pressure device.

Referring to this X-ray, KOK Wohlgemuth ultimately explained the structure and the intended purpose, which was coherent from his perspective and also to the Chamber, as set out in the findings. The X-ray in special volume 1, section 11, p. 9, image 7 (pdf. p. 459), to which supplementary reference is made for the details, shows the upper part of the canister concerned from the front. The uppermost quarter appears lighter than the remainder, which, according to the expert's explanation, indicates that it was almost completely filled.

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The contents of the two plastic containers were established by a report from LKA KTI 23. It further states that, after the USBV was destroyed, one litre of the identified waste-oil mixture remained in the cola bottle. Since the Chamber was persuaded that this additional bottle had been attached to increase the quantity of flammable liquid, it was natural to infer that, like the canister, it had been almost completely filled before the destruction and that the water discharge, particularly given its horizontal position, caused approximately half of its contents to escape.

In the upper left part of the canister, the X-ray shows a rectangular area containing three elongated objects side by side, enclosed by a further outline. According to KOK Wohlgemuth, these were three 1,5 V batteries in a white plastic box. A small switch could be seen above the outermost battery on the right, from which it could be inferred that this assembly was a timer with a preset delay of a few hours, of the kind otherwise familiar from commercially available fairy lights. He had been unable to determine the switch position either at the scene, because of the assumed danger of the USBV, or subsequently from the X-ray; however, in view of the other results of the evidentiary hearing, the Chamber had no doubt that the defendant had operated this switch to start the timer. According to KOK Wohlgemuth, the separately outlined area to the right of this box, in which a layperson could discern only dark dot-like shapes and an elongated plate, could be identified as a circuit-board kit, and the plate as a relay: an electronic component connecting a control circuit to a working circuit switched after a delay by a timer.

The X-ray also shows several wires surrounding this electronic assembly, a battery clip connected to it, and two terminal blocks. The expert stated that, immediately after recovering the USBV, he had found a matching 9-V block battery lying in front of him, which had apparently fallen off the clip while the USBV was being lifted out, particularly since it had not been lying there before recovery.

Against this background, he stated that, even taking into account that not all the small electronic parts installed or the details of the connections between individual components could be clearly discerned on the X-ray, the structure of the electronics and their intended mode of operation should be taken to be as found under III. 3. b).

The expert Blumberg, an electrical engineer with a university of applied sciences qualification, has worked at the BKA since 2003 and has trained bomb-disposal personnel in the possible construction of USBVs since 2005. During the investigation, he had been entrusted with assessing the electronics used in this case and was able to confirm KOK Wohlgemuth's assessment. In this regard, he

added that this was an industrially manufactured base circuit board, freely available as a kit, to be fitted with electronic components at designated soldering points in accordance with the instructions and the intended purpose. Two fragments of the board had been recovered. From their solder sides, he could see that electronic components had been soldered at every fully visible position. However, because he had not had the complete board with all its associated components available, he could not reconstruct the specific intention behind it. Subject to that limitation, a component he had identified as a capacitor could, for example, be used in a USBV to protect a remote initiator from interfering external signals. Because most of the device had been destroyed, he could not determine with certainty from a purely technical perspective whether the USBV was a dummy or not.

On the intended activation of the USBV and the setting of the building on fire, the Chamber heard KHK Warmuth from LKA 522. He has completed initial and further training in explosives investigation and has since been consulted, including in this case, on the construction and possible operation of explosive and incendiary devices. He stated that he assumed the fire caused by the electronics would have melted the plastic containers filled with the fuel mixture — the canister and the cola bottle — thereby creating an additional fire load. Given the substantial heat within the confined light well, this would probably have caused the gas cartridge also incorporated into the device to react. The pressure suddenly generated would probably have escaped sideways rather than upwards because of the confined space in the shaft and, in his assessment as the witness, would have shattered the window pane. KHK Warmuth assumed that the fire would thus either have engulfed the building itself or entered the house through the basement; the Chamber considered this, like his other explanations, understandable in principle even from a lay perspective.

(b) Evidence of the fire expert

Only the expert Dr. Cox, a qualified chemist and head of the Fire and Enclosed-Space Explosion section at the BKA, was ultimately able to explain coherently and convincingly why the USBV could not have set the building on fire in this case, principally because of the inadequate supply of air or oxygen in the shaft. While the trial was already underway, on 28 August 2023, the presiding judge commissioned Dr. Cox to prepare a report on whether, taking into account the specific location where it had been placed, the USBV in question would have been capable of causing a fire or

(also) an explosion, and what consequences would have been expected in that event.

Dr. Cox submitted this fire expert report by email on 27 September 2023, and the presiding judge forwarded it to the parties to the proceedings the following day; the expert gave evidence on it at the trial hearing on 15 November 2023.

She explained in this regard that the liquid in the plastic containers was, in principle, a readily combustible material. For a liquid to burn, heat had to convert it into a gaseous state. A combustible vapour-air mixture then had to form, with the ratio of air to vapour required for combustion depending on the liquid's flash point and vapour pressure, and thus on the substance. Once ignited, the fire “adhered” to the liquid and spread with it. Since the precise composition of the waste-oil and fuel mixture used here was unknown, she could not determine those parameters more precisely for this case; for the same reason, a fire experiment recreating the circumstances would not be expected to yield further insights. However, ignition required an adequate oxygen supply in principle, irrespective of the substance-specific conditions. Based on the dimensions of the light well established by the LKA for her assessment, she, the expert, could rule out such a supply being ensured here.

Accordingly, assuming that the electronics worked, it could be taken that ignition of the matches and the firelighter cubes acting as a catalyst would certainly have been sufficient to burn a hole in the cola bottle and allow liquid to escape. Even if that liquid had entered the gaseous phase and thus ignited, however, the burning liquid would, as it escaped, have reached the stone floor, which was relatively cold owing to its material, and would therefore most probably have gone out again, also because of the poor oxygen supply in the shaft.

In theory, the building could conceivably have caught fire either through the liquid entering via the basement window or through ignition of the exterior wall.

For the liquid to enter the building, however, it would first have had to cover the bottom of the shaft and then pass over the window frame. Even if the fire had burned long enough for the double-glazed window panes to shatter from the heat, this scenario could also be almost ruled out on the basis of the shaft's dimensions.

From her technical perspective, the effect that KHK Warmuth envisaged for the camping gas cartridge attached to the USBV was in fact rather unlikely. For one thing, the base of such cartridges was generally curved inwards for safety reasons, so that the butane inside could expand if unintentionally overheated and bursting could thus be avoided as far as possible. Even if it had nevertheless burst, releasing liquid or gaseous butane, the result would at most have been a brief jet of flame. An explosive reaction of the cartridge would again have required good mixing — of 1,5 to 10 % butane with air — which was very unlikely here given the inadequate ventilation in the shaft, as was the cartridge lifting off and thereby breaking the window pane.

Setting the building on fire via the exterior walls was practically inconceivable because the burning liquid would not have reached them; the jet of flame mentioned would also have been too brief to achieve the intensity of contact between fire and exterior wall necessary for ignition.

(c) Assessment of the defendant's intention

In determining the defendant's intention, the Chamber relied on KHK Warmuth's assessment, which was natural from a lay perspective in this field.

In its application to take evidence of 23 April 2024, the defence argued that, assuming the defendant was the perpetrator, his knowledge of increasing the performance of cars with internal combustion engines meant he must necessarily have known that activation of the USBV at the particular location was “doomed to fail”. This conclusion appeared far from obvious, if only because it was advanced after Dr. Cox's expert evidence; however, the Chamber did not overlook that the defendant was free to choose when to give a (supplementary) account of the facts, without that choice being held against him.

Moreover, the defendant's professional background did not establish the expertise decisive for the assessment at issue here, since the objectives were not comparable. Whereas, in his professional work — as the witness Lindemann named in the application to take evidence reported — the defendant sought to create optimal conditions, including by varying the air-fuel ratio in an internal combustion engine, in order to utilise its performance potential

as fully as possible, the question for the success of the offence here was whether, and if so to what extent, the flammable liquid could actually be ignited in the circumstances at hand, which were not comparable to the largely closed system of an internal combustion engine.

In view of all the other circumstances established, the Chamber was also persuaded that it was plainly unrealistic to suppose that, in making and placing the USBV, the defendant pursued an objective other than the one found.

In this regard, the Chamber considered the possibility that the defendant had merely wanted to frighten the residents by confronting them with the USBV. However, the specific location already spoke against this, as there was nothing to suggest that the USBV would be found there; on the contrary, the chosen basement shaft appeared particularly well suited to concealing the incendiary device from discovery.

The intricate and correspondingly elaborate electronic assembly was one factor indicating that the defendant expected a substantial effect, rather than proceeding on the basis that the USBV was objectively harmless, as submitted in the detention application of 1 December 2023. Furthermore, the Chamber was persuaded that the defendant's established internet searches on 24 April 2022 were consistent only with his expectation of a significant event worth reporting, namely a major fire.

c) Findings concerning the offences of April and May 2020 and November 2022

The findings concerning the other offences are based in substance on the defendant's admissions in that regard, which there was no reason to doubt, particularly since they were confirmed by the supplementary taking of evidence.

The witness KK’in Rink was heard on the coronavirus emergency-aid fraud. She had analysed the bank records of Rambach GmbH and was able to testify that, from 2018 onwards, they no longer showed business activity by the company in the form of turnover.

As to the alterations to the electricity meter and gas pipe, the witness KK Bongard stated that they had been discovered during the defendant's arrest and the search of his flat on 14 December 2022. Enquiries with the network operator Stromnetz Berlin had

• , according to the witness, revealed that the reading taken on 14 December 2022 (89909) matched the last customer reading of 31 July 2020, and thus the meter had, during this

period, apparently not moved. From the defendant's account that he had discovered the tampering with the electricity meter “quite quickly” after moving in, the Chamber inferred that his knowing unauthorised use of electricity began as early as May 2020.

To determine the amount of loss, the Chamber relied on the comprehensible explanations of the witness Berginski, an expert at Stromnetz Berlin. He stated that he had taken account of the information provided by the electrician commissioned to make the repair, the witness Küskü, who, during an inspection of the flat in the course of the repair, estimated daily consumption at 8,5 kwh/Tag on the basis of the electronic devices present. The electricity price during the relevant period was 28 cents per kw/h. On the basis of the period from 31 May 2020 up to and including 14 December 2022 (927 days), the Chamber thus found a consumption loss of 2.206,62 euros.

The findings concerning the details of the gas-pipe alteration are based on the evidence of the witnesses Schulz, a gas-installation mechanic from the emergency service of Netzgesellschaft Berlin-Brandenburg, and Mihajlovic, the installation mechanic commissioned by the property management to carry out the repair. Contrary to the defendant's account, the Chamber dated his alteration of the pipe to a time after 24 November 2022. On that day, the police officers assigned to observe him at the time — the witnesses with coded numbers BEA 99100376, BEA 99100473 and BEA 99100656 — had watched him purchase a long copper pipe during a visit to a hardware store, which was likely to have been the pipe he used to connect the riser to the supply pipe.

V. Legal assessment

The defendant has therefore committed attempted murder in concurrence with attempted arson resulting in death (offences arising from one act), as well as unlawful abstraction of electrical energy, computer fraud and damage to property.

1. Coronavirus emergency-aid fraud

The offence under 1. constitutes computer fraud in the form of influencing a data-processing operation by using incorrect data within the meaning of § 263a Abs. 1 Var. 2 StGB. To distinguish it from subsidy fraud under § 264 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 StGB in conjunction with § 33

264 Abs. 9 Nr. 1 StGB, account had to be taken of the fact that the online form used by the defendant contained only a formulaic phrase concerning the relevance of facts to the subsidy, without specific reference to the corresponding requirements in the underlying application (see KG, judgment of 10 September 2021 — (4) 121 Ss 91/21 (134/21) —, NZWiSt 2022, 446ff.; BGH, order of 4 May 2021 — 6 StR 137/21 —, NStZ 2023, 413 f.).

2. Unlawful abstraction of electrical energy

Bypassing the electricity meter fulfils the offence of unlawful abstraction of electrical energy under § 248c Abs. 1 StGB (see Lackner/Kühl/Heger, StGB, 30th edition 2023, § 248c Rn. 2 with further references). It did not matter that the defendant had not carried out the alteration himself but had merely exploited it, since what matters in this respect is solely the unauthorised use of the energy (Kindhäuser/Neumann/Paeffgen/Saliger, StGB, 6th edition 2023, § 248c Rn. 4 with further references).

3. Placement of the USBV

The placement of the USBV constitutes attempted murder in concurrence with attempted arson resulting in death, as offences arising from one act.

As shown by his Facebook post of 3 March 2022, the defendant knew that the target of the offence was a building used as a human dwelling (§ 306a Nr. 1 Var. 1 StGB).

The Chamber did conclude that, in accordance with the content of his Facebook posts, the defendant primarily wanted to drive the residents out of the building. However, given the unpredictability inherent in a fire, there were no facts to justify his confidence that the potential victims would still be able to escape, particularly at night or early in the morning, or that they would merely be injured rather than killed. Accordingly, when committing the act, the defendant accepted the possibility of their deaths (§§ 306c Abs. 1, 22 StGB). The fact that he had merely commenced execution of the underlying arson offence, and that the serious consequence of death which he accepted as a possibility had likewise not materialised, did not preclude the commission of attempted arson resulting in death (see BGH, judgment of 12 August 2021 — 3 StR 415/20 —, NStZ-RR 2021, 376ff.).

Furthermore, he consciously and with hostile intent exploited the potential victims' lack of suspicion and their resulting defencelessness in committing the act, thereby fulfilling the murder characteristic of Heimtücke (treacherous exploitation of defencelessness).

The defendant did not withdraw from this attempt in a manner exempting him from punishment (strafbefreiender Rücktritt). After operating the timer, the attempt was complete from the perspective of the defendant, who then left the scene (beendeter Versuch). There was no indication that he had voluntarily and earnestly tried to prevent completion of the offence, which failed to occur without any action on his part (§ 24 Abs. 1 Satz 2 StGB).

Insofar as the defendant had also been charged with an offence under the Explosives Act (Sprengstoffgesetz) arising from the same act, the Chamber, with the consent of the Prosecutor General's Office, limited the prosecution pursuant to § 154a Abs. 2 in conjunction with Abs. 1 Nr. 1 StPO in accordance with the guilty verdict underlying this decision.

4. Alteration of the gas pipe

Similarly, in relation to the alteration of the gas pipe, the prosecution for the theft charged was limited to the damage to property committed through the same act within the meaning of § 303 Abs. 1 StGB.

VI. Sentencing

When sentencing for all the offences, the Chamber took into account in the defendant's favour that he had no previous convictions or — as regards offences 3. and 4., taking account of the January 2021 conviction for trespass — at least none of a relevant kind. For the coronavirus emergency-aid fraud and the unlawful abstraction of electrical energy, the confiscation decision was treated as a mitigating factor, as were the defendant's admissions regarding those two offences and the alteration of the gas pipe.

1. Coronavirus emergency-aid fraud

As regards offence 1., it weighed against the defendant that he had claimed both forms of financial assistance available and thereby caused a very substantial loss. Conversely, it was a mitigating factor that the lack of official checks generally made it easy for offenders wrongfully claiming this assistance, including the defendant, to commit the offence.

Having weighed all the circumstances for and against the defendant, the Chamber, applying the sentencing range under § 263a Abs. 1 StGB, considered a substantial

fine of 140 day-fine units necessary to make the wrongfulness of his act clearly apparent to the defendant. The day-fine amount of 5 euros — also for offences 2. and 4. — was determined on the basis of the defendant's current financial circumstances.

2. Unlawful abstraction of electrical energy

In determining the individual sentence for unlawful abstraction of electrical energy, the Chamber treated the relatively long period of unauthorised use and the associated non-negligible loss to the electricity supplier as aggravating factors and, against that background, imposed a fine of 90 day-fine units within the sentencing range under § 248c Abs. 1 StGB.

3. Placement of the USBV

As regards placement of the USBV, the Chamber applied the sentencing range under § 211 StGB as reduced pursuant to § 49 in conjunction with § 22 StGB. It counted in the defendant's favour that, objectively, other people had not even been placed in danger and, given the circumstances described, could not have been. It also counted in his favour that he had acted with the weakest form of intent for this offence, although it was in turn an aggravating factor that he envisaged the possible killing of several people. Having weighed all considerations relevant to sentencing, the Chamber considered five years' imprisonment appropriate to the offence and the defendant's culpability.

4. Alteration of the gas pipe

As regards the damage to the gas pipe, it was held against the defendant that not only the owner himself suffered harm, but — as a foreseeable consequence attributable to the defendant — the need to interrupt the gas supply also affected the residents of the entire building. A fine of 100 day-fine units was therefore imposed on the defendant within the sentencing range under § 303 Abs. 1 StGB.

5. Aggregate sentence

In determining the aggregate sentence, the Chamber again comprehensively assessed all considerations for and against the defendant. It treated in his favour the fact that the fine imposed by the penal order of 11 January 2021 had already been enforced, so that it was no longer possible to form a separate aggregate sentence combining it with the individual sentence imposed here for offence 1. Against that background, the aggregate sentence to be formed here was reduced by two months by way of an adjustment to offset hardship (Härteausgleich).

Ultimately, an aggregate term of imprisonment of five years and four months was appropriate to the defendant's offences and culpability.

The Chamber did not exercise the option of imposing a separate aggregate fine for the offences punished by fines alongside the individual term of imprisonment imposed (§ 53 Abs. 2 Satz 2 StGB). In particular, this was opposed by the fact that the principal offence here was the one punished by an individual term of imprisonment and that burdening the defendant with a fine could jeopardise enforcement of the confiscation decision (see Fischer, StGB, 71st edition 2024, § 53 Rn. 6 with further references).

VII. Confiscation decision

The decision to confiscate the proceeds of the offences is based on § 73 Abs. 1 StGB. In addition to the 14.000 euros obtained through the coronavirus emergency-aid fraud, the financial expenditure saved as a result of the

tampered-with electricity meter over the period from 31 May 2020 to 14 December 2022, totalling 2.206,26 euros, had to be taken into account.

VIII. Costs decision

The costs decision follows from § 465 Abs. 1 Satz 1 StPO.

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