This page records a circumstance I consider worth documenting: the same investigating judge confirmed the seizure of my protest banner in October 2021 and issued the warrant for my detention in December 2022. I do not assert a connection between the two decisions. I place them side by side.
1 05.10.2021 — Confirmation of the seizure
On 17.09.2021, the first day of the Russian Duma election, the “Putin is a Killer” banner was seized at my duly notified rally opposite the Russian embassy — on the public prosecutor’s orders, despite the apparent resistance of the officers deployed, who had seen the same installation for months beforehand without objection. On 01.10.2021, the prosecution applied for subsequent judicial confirmation; on 05.10.2021 it was granted.
§ 98 Abs. 2 StPO (subsequent judicial confirmation) · Art. 5 Abs. 1 GG · Art. 8 GG
Significance: The underlying investigation was later discontinued under § 170 Abs. 2 StPO — without further investigative steps, by a different prosecutor. The question remains what the confirmation in October was based on if, in the end, there was insufficient suspicion to bring charges.
OStA Raupach dossier ·
BackgroundAlternative hypothesis Subsequent judicial confirmation of a seizure is a regular procedure under § 98 Abs. 2 StPO and does not, in itself, imply a judgment on the underlying assembly.
What is missing Reasons why a banner carried at a notified assembly was liable to seizure when the assembly itself was not dispersed.
2 14.12.2022 — Detention warrant and restrictions in custody
On 14.12.2022, the warrant for my detention on a charge of attempted murder was confirmed, and restrictions under § 119 StPO were ordered at the same time. These restrictions meant that I was not allowed contact with other prisoners during the first thirteen months of pre-trial detention. They also form the starting point of the entire chapter on the Jewish community: because the prosecuting authority decided whether telephone contacts could be enabled, it took 140 days for a rabbi to visit for the first time.
§ 112 StPO · § 119 StPO · Art. 4 GG · Art. 6 Abs. 2 EMRK
Significance: The restrictions were not eased after the judgment was pronounced; their effects continued — precisely during the period when I had to prepare the Revision (appeal on points of law).
Chapter on the Jewish communityAlternative hypothesis Contact restrictions under § 119 StPO in pre-trial detention serve to prevent the risk of interference with evidence and are a standard measure in cases involving serious allegations, not a targeted hardship.
What is missing Individual reasons why precisely thirteen months without any contact with other prisoners were necessary to prevent the specific risk of interference with evidence that was assumed.
3 What I say — and what I do not say
I note the following: fourteen months separate the first and second decisions. Both concern me. Both arose from applications by the Berlin prosecution service. Both were signed by the same person.
I do not say that one decision influenced the other. I have no evidence of that, nor would I invent any. I record that the allocation of jurisdiction at Amtsgericht Tiergarten resulted in the same judge deciding both times — and that I consider this worth mentioning in proceedings whose political character the judgment denies.
Art. 101 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG (lawful judge) · §§ 22, 24 StPO (disqualification and recusal)
Significance: I did not apply for recusal at the time — I was then unaware that it was the same person. I apply for the records of both matters to be obtained.
Sources: File reference (348 Gs) 231 Js 3707/21 (3115/21) · Annex 1_F0 (transmission of the file by the Berlin prosecution service to lawyer Piet Mumm on 22.10.2021) · Detention warrant of 14.12.2022. This page presents Dmitry Bagrash’s account and legal assessment and distinguishes between documented episodes and information provided by the person concerned.